Posted: 18/11/2024
In a recent judgment in the High Court, intended parents who conceived a child through international surrogacy were criticised by Mrs Justice Theis for taking ‘risks to pursue their own wish to have a child rather than confront the harsh reality of what they were doing and the consequences of those actions if anything did not go according to their plan’.
The intended parents, A and B, were born in separate countries overseas (neither of which permits homosexuality), but separately settled in England. They formed a relationship in 2017, and in 2020 started their surrogacy journey.
They engaged a surrogacy agency and received questionable advice from them throughout.
As the pregnancy progressed, the intended parents were also told by the agency that due to the ongoing war in country Y, it wasn’t possible for X to give birth there. They were told the birth could happen in Cyprus or country W (for an additional fee), despite same sex surrogacy not being legal in that jurisdiction. They were told by the agency this would be fine, provided A attended the birth alone. The intended parents decided they would follow this advice and agreed for the birth to take place in country W.
Z was born in country W in January 2023 and A assumed care immediately. At this time, A met X (the surrogate mother) for the first time and was named on his child’s birth certificate alongside her. It became clear during their interactions that X was not aware that A and B were a couple. Following the birth, A travelled to country C with Z, and remained there until appropriate travel documents were obtained for Z to enter the UK in August 2023.
The surrogate mother was single, and as such under UK law, was recognised as the child’s legal mother at birth and A (the child’s biological father) as her legal father. The intended parents applied for a parental order following Z’s return to the UK, and the case came before Mrs Justice Theis.
A parental order is a specific application made where a child is born through surrogacy. It is largely governed by section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008), and, provided the criteria in that section are met, and on the basis the court is satisfied that an order meets the child’s welfare needs in accordance with section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, an order can be made which removes legal parenthood from the surrogate, and reassigns legal parenthood and parental responsibility to the intended parent or parents.
While the intended parents in this case did not clearly meet all the section 54 criteria, the court was satisfied that the minor shortcomings (such as being outside the time limit set out in the act to apply) were not barriers to a parental order being made.
However, the final criteria of section 54 of the HFEA 2008 had to be considered further. This states that the surrogate must have been paid no more than reasonable expenses, unless authorised by the court. International surrogacy cases nearly always involve an exercise whereby the court must be asked to authorise expenses paid. In doing so, consideration must be given to whether the intended parents acted in good faith, whether they sought to circumvent child protection procedures, and whether the case is the ‘clearest abuse of public policy’.
The judge accepted (with some hesitation) that the applicants acted in good faith, before turning to consider the question of public policy. This was particularly relevant given that it is likely that the intended parents lied to circumvent the laws in the country of Z’s birth, and, further, did not give a full account as to the circumstances of Z’s birth to country C. In doing so, she strongly criticised the intended parents, putting to them that ‘they turned a blind eye to what should have been obvious to them and took risks’, and commenting that their decision to enter a surrogacy arrangement in a jurisdiction which does not permit same sex relationships, was ‘inexplicable’.
Despite this, Mrs Justice Theis accepted that it was not the ‘clearest case’ of public policy abuse (a threshold set by Mr Justice Hedley in a previous case (Re L (a child) (surrogacy: parental order) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam)), and that Z’s welfare required that a parental order be made. As such an order was granted, ensuring that both A and B would be recognised as Z’s legal parents.
Given the difficulties in this case, the judge endorsed an ‘agreed list of key issues any person considering embarking on a surrogacy arrangement (particularly one that involves the surrogate coming from and/or the child being born in a foreign jurisdiction) should consider before they enter in any surrogacy arrangement’. The list, which is non exhaustive, and acts as a guide only, is set out below:
The case is an example of the importance of obtaining specialist legal advice at the outset of a surrogacy journey – had the intended parents done so, they could avoided the very real risks they had to take during the surrogacy process, and may have reduced the cost and stress of the court proceedings.